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THE NEW NORTH DAKOTA SLAYER STATUTE:
DOES IT CAUSE A CRIMINAL FORFEITURE?
BRADLEY MYERS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The obituary notice for Enolf Snortland listed his son Robert as one of
his survivors.1 The family knew what the community would soon learn—
Robert had shot his father. The personal issues that could cause a minor
fight over a dog chasing sheep to turn into a homicide would never be uncovered. The killing resulted in years of news coverage while authorities
searched for Robert, not always with the support of the victim’s family.2
Authorities recovered Robert’s body not far from the murder scene seven
years later.3
Thirty years later, however, the killing of Enolf Snortland served as
one of the motivations for a change to the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) as
adopted in North Dakota.4 Enolf Snortland’s estate included property that
he and Robert held in joint tenancy.5 Applying the UPC as then effective in
North Dakota, the district court ruled that the joint tenancy property was
severed into equal shares of tenancy in common property, with Enolf
Snortland’s estate taking one share and Robert taking the other.6 Some
legislators expressed amazement that this was the result under the law.7
The court also ruled that Robert’s son, Robbie, would receive the intestate

*
Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law. J.D., University of
Oregon School of Law; LL.M., in Taxation, New York University School of Law; M.S.,
University of California, Los Angeles; B.S., University of California, Los Angeles. Thank you to
Stephanie Jongeward for her invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. ROGER SNORTLAND, FROM GRAYSTONE TO TOMBSTONE 114, 120 (McCleery & Sons
Publ’g 2002).
2. Id. at 147-48.
3. The condition of the body made it impossible to determine either a date or a cause of
death. The cause of death was listed as exposure and the family used the date of the killing as
Robert’s date of death on his headstone. Id. at 150-51.
4. The UPC is adopted in North Dakota as North Dakota Century Code Title 30.
5. See discussion infra Part III.A.
6. The property consisted of two quarters, so the court partitioned the property and gave one
share to the estate of Enolf Snortland outright and ordered the other share held by a conservator
for Robert. SNORTLAND, supra note 1, at 121-22; In re Estate of Snortland, 311 N.W.2d 36, 37
(N.D. 1981). At the time of the supreme court’s decision the whereabouts of Robert Snortland
were unknown. See SNORTLAND, supra note 1, at 150.
7. Janell Cole, Lawmaker Pushes for “Slayer Statute,” GRAND FORKS HERALD, Mar. 4,
2007, at 1A.
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share that Robert would have inherited.8 The change adopted by the legislature reverses the first of these results by changing the treatment of joint
tenancy property when one of the joint tenants kills another.
Equity has laid out the principle that no person should be allowed to
profit from his or her wrongdoing.9 Application of the Principle of Public
Policy is often fairly easy. For example, there is no question that a thief is
not entitled to keep the items stolen. Criminals can also be required to forfeit property acquired with the proceeds of criminal activity, used to
facilitate a criminal offense or offered to others as an inducement to commit
a criminal offense.10
Application of the Principle of Public Policy is more challenging, however, when the lives and property of the victim and the criminal are intertwined. Several situations exist where the death of one person will lead to
property passing to another by operation of law. When the property passes
by intestacy or by will, the transfer is covered by probate law.11 When the
property passes via some non-probate mechanism, the transfer is covered by
general principles of property law.12 Absent some exception, probate law
will pass the property of a victim to a killer if the relationship between the
parties would cause the property to pass by intestacy or if the killer is
named in the victim’s will.13 A killer can also take property owned by the
victim outside of probate if the ownership of the property provides for such
a transfer.14

8. Under North Dakota Century Code Sections 30.1-04-02 and 30.1-04-03, Enolf Snortland’s
surviving spouse Mae received the first $50,000 of the estate plus one half of the remainder. The
other one-half of the remainder passed to Enolf Snortland’s children by representation. Because
Robert was treated as having predeceased under North Dakota Century Code Section 30.1-1003(1), Robbie received the one-fifth share of the estate that would have passed to Robert. In re
Estate of Snortland, 311 N.W.2d at 39.
9. For a review of the historical development of the Principle of Public Policy, see generally
Alison Reppy, The Slayer’s Bounty—History of Problem in Anglo-American Law, 19 N.Y.U. L.
Q. REV. 229 (1942). The equitable principle shall be referred to in this paper as the “Principle of
Public Policy.” See id. at 241-42 (citing Amicable Soc’y v. Bolland, 4 Bligh (N.S.) 194, 5 Eng.
Rep. 70 (1815)).
10. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-31-1 (2007).
11. Probate law is technically a subsection of property law. For purposes of this article
references to “property law” will refer to all areas of property law other than probate law.
12. In some situations specific statutory schemes may have been adopted to take the transfer
out of property law generally. In others, the transfer of property may be covered by contract law
(e.g., life insurance).
13. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-101,-103 (2006) (governing intestate succession); id. § 2602 (providing that a “will may provide for the passage of all property the testator owns at death
and all property acquired by the estate after the testator’s death”).
14. In addition to joint tenancy with right of survivorship, individuals can take property
outside of property under a number of mechanisms, e.g., payable on death provisions. See UNIF.
PROBATE CODE §§ 6-101,-212 (2006).
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The “slayer statute” is the application of the Principle of Public Policy
when the property of a victim will pass to a killer because of the operation
of property law.15 Under the slayer statute, generally, a killer is prevented
from receiving property from the victim’s estate. Slayer statutes operate in
part by automatically doing on behalf of the victim those things that the
victim could have done while still alive. These include revoking gifts under
a will or revocable trust, changing beneficiary designations under life insurance or payable on death bank accounts, and voiding any fiduciary nominations made by the victim on behalf of the killer.16 When dealing with
property that the killer owned by operation of law, courts have used constructive trusts to give equitable title to individuals other than the killer,
while still giving legal title to the killer as required under probate or
property law.17
Joint tenancy property has presented a difficult situation in applying the
Principle of Public Policy because, unlike the other situations governed by
the slayer statute, the killer actually owns a property interest in the joint
tenancy property. A bedrock principle of modern law is that individuals
should not be subject to forfeiture of their property simply because they
committed a crime.18 Such forfeiture would be punishment for the crime
and punishment is the province of the criminal law system.19
North Dakota has long had a legislatively adopted slayer statute on the
books.20 Prior to the recent change, the slayer statute provided that when
15. For purposes of this article the term “slayer statute” will refer to all legal mechanisms
that alter property or probate law to prevent a killer from succeeding to the property of a victim
whether that mechanism is created by legislation or common law.
16. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03 (1996). In a similar manner, transfers from a
decedent to a divorced spouse are also automatically revoked. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804
(2006).
17. See e.g., In re Cox’s Estate, 380 P.2d 584, 588-89 (Mont. 1962).
18. Matthew B. Ford, Comment, Criminal Forfeiture and the Sixth Amendment’s Right to
Jury Trial Post-Booker, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 1371, 1403 (2007).
Following ratification of the Constitution, attainder quickly went out of style. The
First Congress quickly banned the use of in personam forfeiture, attainder, and
corruption of blood, and several states passed similar laws in the years thereafter.
With the death of attainder, American legislatures effectively laid criminal forfeiture
to rest for the next two centuries.
Id.
19. Forfeiture in this situation needs to be distinguished from forfeiture of property used in
the furtherance of criminal activity. Such forfeitures are considered in rem proceedings brought
against the property itself. The actions are thus not criminal in nature and not subject to the
general protections available under the criminal law. See State v. One 1990 Chevrolet Pickup,
523 N.W. 2d 389, 392-94 (N.D. 1994).
20. The first slayer statute in North Dakota was adopted in 1895:
No person who has been finally convicted of feloniously causing the death of another
shall take or receive any property or benefit by succession, will or otherwise, directly
or indirectly by reason of the death of such person, but all property of the deceased
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one joint tenant killed another, the joint tenancy was severed, with each
party taking an equal share as tenants in common.21 The change adopted by
the North Dakota Legislature alters this result by holding that the interest of
the killer in the property becomes void.22
The issue to be examined herein is the new North Dakota Slayer Statue
and its consistency with general principles of equity and principles of law.
This article will begin with a brief history of the slayer statutes, including
their treatment under the Restatement of Property, the Uniform Probate
Code and the North Dakota Century Code. Next, the paper will review the
nature of joint tenancy ownership of property. A review of the historical
treatment of criminal forfeiture will follow. Finally, the new North Dakota
slayer statute will be assessed as a criminal forfeiture for its compliance
with the constitutional requirements for such forfeiture.
II. SLAYER STATUTES
Neither American nor English courts were extensively troubled with
the issue of killers taking the property of their victims until the middle of
the nineteenth century.23 However, a court actually confronted the issue as
early as 1572.24 The likelihood that the killer would be put to death coupled
with the legal concepts of attainder, forfeiture, and corruption of blood
resulted in neither the killer nor the killer’s family inheriting any property
from the victim.25 With the repeal of attainder, courts, and, eventually,
legislatures needed to find some other legal doctrine to prevent killers from
profiting from their crimes. English courts did so by discovering the

and all rights conditioned upon his death shall vest and be determined the same as if
the person convicted was dead.
REVISED CODES OF THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA § 3682 (1895). The state adopted the UPC
and its version of the slayer statute in 1972. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-04-23 (1972).
21. “The intentional and felonious killing of the decedent: . . . (b) Severs the interests of the
decedent and killer in property held by them at the time of the killing as joint tenants with the right
of survivorship, transforming the interests of the decedent and killer into tenancies in common.”
N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03(3)(b) (1996).
22. “The intentional and felonious killing of the decedent: . . . (b) Voids the interests of the
killer in property held with the decedent at the time of the killing as joint tenants with the right of
survivorship.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03(3)(b) (2007) [hereinafter, the new North Dakota
slayer statute].
23. The history of the slayer statute relies heavily on the work of Reppy, supra note 9, at
229.
24. Reppy, supra note 9, at 229 (citing Brooke v. Warde, 3 Dyre 310b, 73 Eng. Rep. 702
(1572)).
25. See discussion infra Part IV.
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Principle of Public Policy, “which forbade a criminal from profiting from
his own wrong.”26
Slayer statutes in the United States began first under common law
interpretations of property law. More recently, these common law rules
have been codified. Whether by court or legislature, the Principle of Public
Policy is the driving equitable force behind the slayer statute.
A. COMMON LAW
The Supreme Court adopted in the 1886 case of Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Armstrong27 the Principle of Public Policy into United States law. 28
The case involved a killer who took out a policy on the life of the victim
with the intent of killing the victim to receive the insurance proceeds. The
Court held that as a matter of law one could not recover insurance money
payable upon the death of a party whose life the killer had taken.29
Beginning with Riggs v. Palmer,30 state courts began adopting the
Principle of Public Policy into their common laws.31 The Principle of
Public Policy allowed courts to prevent slayers from inheriting property in
the absence of a legislatively adopted slayer statute. The Restatement 32 has
attempted to reconcile these common law differences.
The Restatement provides that a slayer must be “denied any right to
benefit from the wrong.”33 The slayer’s motive in committing the wrong is
irrelevant and application of the slayer statute does not require
establishment of a financial motive in the slaying.34 The slayer statute

26. “[T]he Court of Appeal in the Cleaver case . . . discovered and promulgated the ‘socalled rule of public policy,’ which forbade a criminal from profiting from his own wrong.”
Reppy, supra note 9, at 242 (quoting Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund L. Ass’n., 1 Q.B. 147 (C.A.
1892)).
27. 117 U.S. 591 (1886).
28. Armstrong, 117 U.S. at 600 (1886) (citing the “common law maxim” ex turpis causa non
action (no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong) as the justification for its
ruling).
29. Id. at 600.
30. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). The Riggs case concerned a man who killed his grandfather to
hasten his inheritance under the grandfather’s will was prohibited from inheriting the property. Id.
at 191.
31. Brian W. Underdahl, Creating a New Public Policy in Estate of O’Keefe: Judicial
Legislation Using a Slayer Statute in a Novel Way, 44 S.D. L. REV. 828, 835-36 (1998).
32. References to the “Restatement” will refer jointly to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 (2003) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY); and the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 188 (hereinafter RESTATEMENT
OF RESTITUTION). Both the Restatement of Property and the Restatement of Restitution deal with
the application of the slayer statute and the analyses under both are the same.
33. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 8.4(a); see also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 188
cmt. a.
34. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 8.4(a) cmt. b.
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applies even if the property probably would have gone to the slayer
eventually.35
The Restatement recognizes that the slayer statute varies the results that
would occur under normal property law rules and justifies this variation
because the result is neither punitive, which is the function of criminal law,
nor compensatory, which is the function of tort law. Both these conclusions, however, depend on the fact that the slayer statute “does not cause
the killer to forfeit any of his or her own property . . . , but prevents the
killer from benefiting from the wrong that he or she has committed.”36
In most jurisdictions, the common law slayer statute has given way to a
legislatively adopted slayer statute.37 The common law history, however, is
still helpful for courts in interpreting the slayer statutes.38
B. LEGISLATIVELY ADOPTED SLAYER STATUTES
Starting in the early 1900s, a majority of states began adopting slayer
statutes to govern the situation where a property of a victim will pass to his
or her killer.39 The first attempt to bring uniformity to the area began with
an article published by Professor John Wade of Harvard University. 40
Attempts at uniformity have continued through the work of the Uniform
Law Commissioners.41 These statutes, whether crafted by legislatures or by
others attempting to bring uniformity to the area of the law, have attempted
to specifically provide for the situations in which the slayer statute will
apply and what should happen to the property affected.
35. Id. cmt. c; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 188 cmt. a (“[W]here it is doubtful whether
or not he would have had an interest if he had not committed the murder, the chances are resolved
against him.”).
36. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 8.4 cmt. a; see also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
§ 188 cmt. a.
37. Forty-three states have passed legislative slayer statutes. Gregory Blackwell, Property:
Creating a Slayer Statute Oklahomans Can Live With, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 143, 168 (2004). Three
states still use common law slayer statutes: Maryland, Missouri and New York. Id. at 168-69
(citing Prince v. Hitaffer, 165 A. 470 (Md. 1933); Perry v. Strawbridge, 108 S.W. 641, 648 (Mo.
1908); and Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. App. Div. 1889)). Two states, Massachusetts and
New Hampshire, have neither a judicial nor a legislative slayer statute. Id.
38. This is particularly true for slayer statutes that provide that the killer will not inherit
property from the victim, but which fail to define the terminology or provide any other practical
guidance. See, e.g., Bradley v. Fox, 129 N.E.2d 699, 703-05 (Ill. 1955).
39. Forty-three states have passed legislative slayer statutes. Blackwell, supra note 37, at
168; see also Julie J. Olenn, Comment, ‘Til Death Do Us Part: New York’s Slayer Rule and In re
Estate of Covert, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1341, 1341 n.3 (2001).
40. John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Willfully Killing Another—A Statutory
Solution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715, 723 (1936). Twenty-five states had already adopted slayer
statutes by the time of Professor Wade’s article. Id. at 715 n.1.
41. The UPC was first promulgated in 1969. It has been significantly amended on several
occasions. About one-third of the states have adopted all, or substantially all of at least part of the
UPC. DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUST AND ESTATES 60 (7th ed. 2005).
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Drafting a statute to apply the Principle of Public Policy can be quite
challenging because the equitable arguments vary depending on the facts
surrounding the killing.42 Three general scenarios can be identified. The
first scenario is where a killer is motivated by the desire to take the property
from the victim. This can occur when the victim has made a will benefiting
the killer and has threatened to change the will to disinherit the killer,43
when the killer would inherit the property of the victim by intestacy,44 or
when the killer and victim are joint properties of ownership with survivorship.45 In all these cases the killing causes the victim to lose enjoyment of
the property and denies the victim the opportunity to affect the distribution
of his or her property.46
The second scenario is killings where the fact that the killer inherits
property from the victim either by inheritance, intestacy or survivorship
plays no role in the motive for the killing. This usually occurs when the
victim and killer are members of the same family.47 These cases equally
deprive the victims of the enjoyment of their property and control over its
distribution. While these cases do not involve the greed motivation that
exists under the first scenario, the fact that the perpetrator will take ownership of the victim’s property has served as justification for treating these
two scenarios the same.48
The third scenario involves killers who commit suicide immediately
after killing the victim. It can be assumed that under this scenario the killer
is not motivated by a desire to receive the victim’s property. Further, the
killer will not actually receive any property, preventing any “profit” from
the killing. The question then becomes whether the slayer statute should be
used to deny the killer’s heirs, who may also be relatives of the victim, from
receiving property from the deceased.
These shifting equitable considerations underlay the policy considerations faced by drafters in constructing a slayer statute. The more practical
consideration, however, is how to provide sufficient guidance to the courts

42. See Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 489, 491-96 (1986).
43. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 189-90 (N.Y. 1889); Garwols v. Bankers’ Trust Co., 232
N.W. 239, 239 (Mich. 1930).
44. Peeples v. Corbett, 157 So. 510, 511 (Fla. 1934).
45. In re Estate of Cox, 380 P.2d 584, 586 (Mont. 1963).
46. See Fellows, supra note 42, at 493.
47. State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 363 N.E.2d 785, 785 (Ill. 1977) (wife killed estranged
husband); Leavy, Taber, Schultz, & Bergdahl v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 581 P.2d 167, 168 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1978) (wife killed husband).
48. However, the killing is much more likely under this second scenario to be treated as
manslaughter, which could result in the inapplicability of the slayer statute.
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who must administer the law. In other words, how do we implement policy
choices in structuring the slayer statute?
C. THE STRUCTURE OF A SLAYER STATUTE
The creation of a slayer statute, by either a court or a legislature,
requires a resolution to three questions: Who is a slayer? What property is
lost? And, who takes the property?49
1.

Who Is a Slayer?

The slayer statute recommended by Professor Wade identified a killer
as one whose act was willful and unlawful.50 The majority of states have
accepted the standard presented in the UPC that the killing must be
felonious and intentional.51 The Restatement uses the same language. 52
This definition limits the application of the slayer statute to murder and
voluntary manslaughter. A small minority of states include killings with a
lower level of culpability.53 Clearly, however, one who might cause the
death of another through negligence or some other non-criminal act will not
have his chance to inherit affected by the slayer statute.54
An extremely important aspect of slayer statutes is that they do not
require that the killer be convicted of a crime. While this makes sense in
the abstract because of the great likelihood that in some cases the killer will
not survive long enough to stand trial, it raises the distinct possibility that a
person could be found not guilty of committing a murder, but still be
49. See Blackwell, supra note 36, at 145. Legislature must deal with these questions
directly. Court decisions are almost always limited to the facts before the court, making it
difficult to find specific answers to these questions.
50. Wade, supra note 40, at 721-22.
51. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(b) (amended 1997). The effect of the UPC definition of
slayer is that many people who take the lives of others will not be considered slayers. Killers who
are found to be insane, those whose acts were not intentional and those who killed in self-defense
will not be affected by the application of the slayer statute. Callie Kramer, Notes & Comments,
Guilty by Association: Inadequacies in the Uniform Probate Code Slayer Statute, 19 N.Y. L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTS. 697, 705-08 (2003).
52. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 8.4(a). The Restatement of Restitution Section 188 does
not provide a standard but merely refers to the “murder” of the victim by the killer.
53. Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CINN. L. REV. 803,
848 n.213 (1993) (citing the slayers statutes of Colorado, District of Columbia, Indiana and
Oklahoma as referring to “manslaughter” and that the “criminal statutes of those jurisdictions
characterize some unintentional homicides as manslaughter”). One commentator has recommended extending the slayer statute to elder abuse situations, even if the abuse was not
responsible for the death of the victim. Robin L. Preble, Family Violence and Family Property: A
Proposal for Reform, 13 LAW & INEQ. J. 401, 412-13 (1995).
54. This does not mean, however, that the estate of a tort victim does not have a claim
against the tortfeasor. The extent the tortfeasor might inherit would be reduced by any recovery in
the estate of decedent. Julie Waller Hampton, Comment, The Need for a New Slayer Statute in
North Carolina, 24 CAMPBELL L. REV. 295, 295 (2002).
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prevented from inheriting from the victim because of a determination that a
felonious and intentional killing took place.55 This is possible because the
slayer statutes use a lower standard of proof than is required in a criminal
trial. The felonious and intentional killing only needs to be established by a
preponderance of the evidence.56
North Dakota had adopted the UPC definition and applies its slayer
statute only to killers who have feloniously and intentionally killed their
victims. Further, because North Dakota’s criminal law contains the distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, the state is among
the majority of states that require voluntary action on the part of the killer.
North Dakota has also adopted without change the UPC’s lower standard of
proof in slayer cases and in allowing conviction of murder to be conclusively proven that an individual is covered by the statute.57
2.

What Property Is Lost?

Discussion of what property the killer loses requires consideration of
the property affected. One of the justifications for the slayer statute under
the Restatement is the conclusion that the killer does not actually lose any
of his own property.58 The killing of another causes disruption to the “normal” transfer of property in three ways: (1) the victim loses the enjoyment
of the property; (2) the victim loses the ability to change the disposition of
the property on death; and, (3) the “normal” order of death of the victim and
the potential takers of the property becomes unascertainable.59 A slayer
statute can do nothing to restore the victim’s enjoyment of the property, but
it should attempt to ameliorate the other two disruptions to the extent
possible.60
One basic assumption under the slayer statute is that had the victims
known that they would be killed, they would have elected to prevent the
killers from inheriting any of their property. The easiest method of

55. A conviction that establishes felonious and intentional killing establishes the person as a
killer for purposes of the UPC. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(g) (2006). Some jurisdictions,
however, allow the killer to relitigate his status as a killer, some even preventing the conviction
from coming into evidence. Blackwell, supra note 37, at 173.
56. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(g) (2006).
57. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03(7) (2007).
58. The main purpose of this paper is dealing with the question of whether the change to the
North Dakota slayer statute has changed this justification.
59. Fellows, supra note 42, at 504.
60. Id. at 504-05.
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implementing this presumption is denying the killer of the right to receive
property by intestacy or by will.61
Much more challenging, however, is handling the non-probate methods
of property transfer. Some of the non-probate interests can be denied using
the same reasoning and implementation as the probate transfers. For example, if the killer is the beneficiary of a revocable trust established by the
victim, the killer can be denied any benefit under the trust by treating the
killer’s interest in the trust as having been revoked.62 Similarly, killers can
be denied the right to receive the proceeds of life insurance on their
victims.63
Other potential situations exist. As a general rule, the slayer statutes
deny property to the killer if the victim had a right to revoke the gift. 64
Slayer statutes do not, however, deny property to the killer when the victim
did not have a right to revoke the transfer.65 This even includes situations
where the victim could have altered the distribution of the property, but did
not have a power to revoke. For example, a donor names the killer the taker
in default of a power of appointment and the victim the donee. By killing
the victim, the killer eliminates the only person who could deny him the
property under the power of appointment, but the property did not belong to
the victim and the designation of the killer as the taker in default is not in
the discretion of the victim.66
Dealing with the fact that the killing changed the order of deaths is
more difficult. While the fact that the killer might not have outlived the
victim is dealt with by denying the killer the right to receive the victim’s
property, the same rule will not help in dealing with the fact that others
might have predeceased the victim or with property not actually owned by
61. This result occurs not only in states with slayer statutes that specifically call for it, see
Uniform Probate Code § 2-803, but also in states where it does not. Wright v. Wright, 449
S.W.2d 952, 953-54 (Ark. 1970) (involving a killer that was denied the right to take property by
intestacy); Welch v. Welch, 252 A.2d 131, 133-34 (Del. Ch. 1969) (involving a killer that was
denied the right to take property under the victim’s will).
62. Because the trust is not under the jurisdiction of a court, it will be necessary for either the
trustee or one of the other beneficiaries to ask a court to order the trustee not to provide any
benefits to the killer.
63. This is easily the case if the victim owned the policy and retained the right to change the
beneficiary. A more difficult question arises if the policy is owned by others. UPC Section 2803(b) only revokes the designation of a killer on an insurance policy if the victim had the right to
revoke the designation. Courts in some jurisdictions have, however, declared it a violation of
public policy for a killer to receive the proceeds of life insurance on a victim regardless of who
owned the policy. See, e.g., Merrity v. Prudential Ins. Co., 166 A. 335, 336 (N.J. 1933).
64. The result can be affected either by treating the designation of the killer as being revoked
or by treating the killer as having predeceased the event that would result in the killer receiving
the property.
65. See Fellows, supra note 42, at 504-10.
66. Id. at 510.
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the victim. For example, suppose a third party created an irrevocable trust
that paid income interests jointly to the victim and killer. Here, the victim
does not own the property, so the slayer statute should not apply. However,
suppose the gift further provides that the corpus of the trust will go to the
survivor of the victim and killer. Here, because the killing has determined
who should take the property, the killer should be denied an interest to keep
him from increasing his interest by committing the killing. 67 If the death of
the victim has no impact on the ultimate receiver of the property, however,
the slayer statute should not interfere.68
Other than with respect to joint tenancy property, North Dakota has
adopted the UPC’s position that denies killers the right to receive property
from the estate of the victim by either will or intestacy and which revokes
all revocable dispositions of property in favor of the killer.69 North Dakota
has not, however, taken any actions amending its version of the UPC to deal
with the other situations where a killer might take property controlled by
someone other than the victim.
3.

Who Takes?

The biggest issue underlying the question of who should take the
property in lieu of the killer is whether the issue of the killer should be
allowed to take the property.70 Although there is one example of a lower
court preventing property from passing to relatives of the killer as well as
the killer herself,71 the general rule provides that the wrongdoing on the part
of the killer is not attributed to members of the killer’s family.
The main arguments provided by those who consider that family
members should also be denied property have largely failed to achieve
traction in either the courts or in legislatures. The family members are simply not guilty of any wrongdoing. In most cases, the family members are
also objects of the victim’s bounty as well. The fact that a man kills his
father does not lead to the conclusion that the victim would want to cut off
his grandchildren.72
It should be noted, however, that a court applying a common law slayer
statute has prevented the heirs of a killer from receiving the victim’s

67. The UPC version of the slayer statute would have no impact under this scenario, allowing
the killer to keep the property. See, e.g., Fellows, supra note 42, at 510-11.
68. Id. at 511.
69. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-10-03(3), 30.1-10-03(4) (2007).
70. See Kramer, supra note 51, at 697-98.
71. In re Estates of Covert, 761 N.E.2d 571, 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (denying property to
relatives of a killer overturned on appeal).
72. Kramer, supra note 51, at 714.
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property. In Cook v. Grierson,73 the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that
the children of a slayer were prohibited from inheriting from the estate of
the victim, their grandfather, under the common law slayer statute applicable in the state.74 The decedent died intestate and the court ruled that the
grandchildren could not take under the state’s intestacy statute because their
father, the killer, was still alive. The slayer statute disqualified their father
from inheriting and the fact that the father was alive prevented the children
from qualifying under the slayer statute.75
North Dakota has adopted the UPC language that provides that
property will pass as if the killer had predeceased the victim.76 Issue of the
killer can step up and inherit from the victim under either intestacy or the
application of the anti-lapse statute.
The North Dakota Supreme Court dealt with this issue directly in the
Snortland case. The estate of the victim passed by intestacy.77 The personal representative argued that the heirs of the killer should be precluded
from taking anything from the victim’s estate. The court, however, held
that the statute clearly provided that “while a killer is not entitled to share in
his victim’s estate, the share he otherwise would have taken passes as
though he had predeceased his victim.”78 Under the laws of intestacy, this
means that the killer’s heirs will take the killer’s share of the estate by
representation. The North Dakota slayer statute does not affect the relationship between the deceased victim and any person other than the killer.79

73. 845 A.2d 1231 (Md. 2004).
74. Cook, 845 A.2d at 1232. Maryland does not have a legislative slayer statute. Id. at 1233.
75. If a slayer statute similar to the UPC version had been adopted in Maryland, then the
killer would have been treated as predeceasing the victim and the grandchildren would have
qualified under the intestacy statute in place in the state. Tara L. Pehush, Maryland is Dying for A
Slayer Statute: The Ineffectiveness of the Common Law Slayer Rule in Maryland, 35 U. BALT. L.
REV. 271, 289-90 (2004).
76. Under North Dakota Century Code Section 30.1-10-03(2) killers are treated as having
disclaimed any interest as an intestate taker and under North Dakota Century Code Section 30.110-03(5) other governing instruments are given effect as if the killer disclaimed all revoked
provisions. Disclaimers are governed by North Dakota Century Code Section 30.1-10.1-01-12
and provides generally that disclaimants are treated as having predeceased.
77. Under the intestacy statute in place at the time (North Dakota Century Code Section
30.1-04-02) the victims surviving spouse received the first $50,000 of the estate and one-half of
the balance. The rest passed to the victim’s heirs by representation.
78. North Dakota Century Code Section 30.1-10-03 only refers to the “individual who
intentionally and feloniously kills the decedent” in application of the slayer statute. Any rights of
the issue of the killer will be decided based on the relationship of those individuals to the decedent
and the terms of any governing instrument. See In re Estate of Snortland, 311 N.W.2d 36, 39-40
(N.D. 1981).
79. Id. at 39 (citing the Editorial Board Comments to Title 30.1).
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III. JOINT TENANCY AND THE SLAYER STATUTE
A. THE NATURE OF JOINT TENANCY PROPERTY
The new North Dakota slayer statute only differs from the UPC version
in its treatment of property held by the victim and killer as joint tenants
with right of survivorship. Joint tenancy property has always presented a
bit of a problem under the slayer statute because of the difficulty in untangling the ownership interests of the killer and victim. The presumption,
outlined by the Restatement, is that a slayer statute should only be used to
prevent a killer from receiving the property of the victim and joint tenancy
property is owned, at least in part, by the killer.
Joint tenancy is defined as ownership “by several persons in equal
shares by a title created by a single will or transfer, when expressly declared
in the will or transfer to be a joint tenancy.”80 Property held jointly that is
not held in joint tenancy is held as tenants in common.81
Joint tenants have the right of survivorship, meaning that no probate or
other proceeding is necessary to pass the property to the surviving joint
tenants on death. This right was deemed to exist because the joint tenants,
as a group, are deemed to own the property. Under this theory, each of the
joint tenants owns the undivided whole of the property. When one member
of the group dies, nothing transfers from the deceased to the other joint
tenants. Rather, the ownership of the property continues in the joint tenant
group, albeit now reduced in number by the loss of the decedent.82
Under the common law, joint tenancies required the existence of the
“four unities” of interest, title, time, and possession to exist equally for all
joint tenants at the same time.83 A failure in one of these unities would
80. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-06 (2007).
81. Id. § 47-02-08. “An interest in common is one owned by several persons not in joint
ownership or partnership. Every interest created in favor of several persons in their own right is
an interest in common, unless acquired by them in partnership for partnership purposes, or unless
declared in its creation to be a joint tenancy.” Id.
82. It is this ownership by the group that allowed property held by joint tenants to avoid the
requirements of the wills acts when one of the members died. Since nothing passed to the
surviving joint tenant, it was unnecessary to effectuate the ownership in the survivors. Although
treated as owning nothing for property and probate purposes, the value of the jointly held property
is still included in a decedent’s estate for purposes of determining the estate tax. See I.R.C.
§ 2040 (1981).
83. 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 31.06(a) (David A. Thompson ed., 2d Thompson ed.
2004). The interest of each joint tenant must be acquired or vest at the same time; all joint tenants
must acquire title by the same instrument; all tenants must have equal undivided shares and
identical interests measure by duration; and each must have right to possession to the whole
property. The requirement for equal ownership is largely ignored in cases where it matters, i.e., if
one of two joint tenants provides more than half of the capital necessary to acquire property, the
court in a partition action would likely award the parties shares based on their actual contributions.
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cause the ownership of the property to transmute to a tenancy in common.84
Joint tenants could convert the joint tenancy to a tenancy in common at any
time by destroying anyone of the four unities.85 Joint tenants could also
bring partition actions against one another asking the court to either divide
the property into physically separate parcels or that the property be sold
with the proceeds split between the joint tenants.
North Dakota, however, has long dispensed with the “Blackstonian”
doctrine of the four unities and held that joint tenancy will exist when the
conditions of the statute are met.86 Essentially, joint tenancy with right of
survivorship is created when the owners of the property take title as joint
tenant.87
Many jurisdictions recognize tenancy by the entirety, a form of
ownership similar to joint tenancy, for property jointly owned by spouses.88
Tenancy by the entirety is a form of joint ownership that can exist solely
between spouses. It is similar to joint tenancy in that the property automatically passes to the survivor on the death of one of the spouses. This
form essentially adds an additional unity to the four required for joint
tenancy, i.e., the requirement that the joint owners be married to one
another. Tenants by the entirety face limitations on their ownership in that
they may not change the ownership of the property without the consent of
their spouses. This means that the ownership cannot be defeated by transferring the interest of one spouse to another and that neither spouse has the
right to seek judicial partition of the property.89 Tenancy by the entirety has
never been recognized in North Dakota.90 States with tenancy by the
entirety will often include it in their slayer statutes.91
B. TREATMENT OF JOINT TENANCY PROPERTY UNDER THE SLAYER
STATUTE
Joint tenancy property has always presented a special case under
application of the slayer statute. Applying the slayer statute to property that
was fully owned or controlled by the victim did not require taking property
84. See Carson v. Ellis, 348 P.2d 807, 809 (Kan. 1960); Snyder v. Snyder, 212 N.W.2d 869,
872 (Minn. 1973).
85. This could be done by agreement of all the joint tenants, or by the action of a lone joint
tenant by merely conveying his interest to a third party.
86. Renz v. Renz, 256 N.W.2d 883, 885 (1977).
87. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-06 (2007).
88. Tenancy by the entirety is recognized in approximately fifty percent of jurisdictions.
89. Any attempt by one spouse to transfer his or her interest in the property to a third party
will be void.
90. Renz, 256 N.W.2d at 885 (citing Schimke v. Karlstad, 208 N.W.2d 710 (1973)).
91. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 112.475 (2005).
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away from the killer. The killer had, at best, an expectancy of receiving the
property. Expectancies are not property rights, so denying the killer the
right to receive the property did not require courts to examine or even
consider the effect the slayer statute had on the property rights of the killer.
Because joint tenancy property represents the ownership of at least some
interest in the underlying property by the killer, application of the slayer
statute requires courts and legislatures to determine what, if any, impact the
existence of this property interest should have on the disposition of the
property.
C. TREATMENT BY AUTHORITIES
The UPC takes the position that the killing should be treated as a
severance of the joint tenancy.92 The application of this provision was
clearly demonstrated by North Dakota Supreme Court in Snortland.93 The
district court had held that the killer retained an undivided interest as a
tenant-in-common with his father’s estate in property that had been held by
them as joint tenants with right of survivorship.94 The court took note of
the various common law solutions to the slayer situation, but held that it
was merely necessary to apply the statute since the legislature had provided
specific relief by adopting the UPC version of the slayer statute. The statute provided that when the killing of a joint tenant affects a severance of
that tenancy, the severance of a joint tenancy results in the tenancy in
common.95
Of particular importance is the court’s footnote to this discussion. The
court states that, “A contrary result, awarding all of the joint tenancy
property to the decedent’s estate, would work a forfeiture on the killer.”96 It
then relates this forfeiture to common law attainders and ultimately to
authority that such attainders have been abandoned under modern policies
of law.97

92. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(c)(2) (2006).
93. In re Estate of Snortland, 311 N.W.2d 36, 37-39 (N.D. 1981). The son, Robert E.
Snortland, was later discovered to have died not long after killing his father. Cole, supra note 7,
at 4A. This fact was unknown at the time of the Supreme Court decision. Id.
94. Snortland, 311 N.W.2d at 36. The court applied North Dakota Century Code Section
30.1-10-03(2), which at the time provided that: “Any joint tenant who feloniously and
intentionally kills another joint tenant thereby effects a severance of the interest of the decedent so
that the share of the decedent passes as his property and the killer has no rights by survivorship.”
The language was taken from the Uniform Probate Code Section 2-803 (1969). Id.
95. Id. at 38 (citing Renz v. Renz, 256 N.W. 2d 883 (N.D. 1977)).
96. Id.
97. The North Dakota Constitution, Article I, Section 18, prohibits Bills of Attainder from
being passed by the legislature. North Dakota Century Code Section 12.1-33-02 also provides
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However, the court did leave open the possibility that it would accept
the forfeiture of the property via another method. The estate of the decedent argued that the court should apply the portion of the slayer statute that
calls for the victim’s estate to be distributed as if the killer had predeceased
the victim.98 If this were done, then the joint tenancy property would pass
completely to the victim. The court held, however, that because the legislature had provided a specific provision governing the disposition of joint
tenancy property, that it was bound to follow that provision.99 Failing to do
so would render the joint tenancy provision “nugatory.”100 The court then
stated, “If the legislature had intended that joint tenancy property be governed by § 30.1-10-03(1), NDCC, it could have expressly provided so.”101
The court does not provide any answer to the question of whether the
legislature’s attempt to give the property completely to the victim would
survive the scrutiny of the law as a forfeiture, but merely describes the
statutory structure that had, in fact, been adopted.
In dealing with joint tenancy property, the Restatement takes the
position that the killer of a joint tenant retains a life estate in half the
property.102 The estate of the victim will hold a life estate in the other half
of the property and the remainder interest in the property. In fact, the
Restatement takes the position that treating the killing as effecting a
severance of the joint tenancy requires some equitable justification.103 A
severance is viewed as benefiting the killer at the expense of the estate of
the victim. In other words, prior to the killing, the killer only held a life
estate and a possibility of receiving all the property on the death of the joint
tenant. Turning this possibility of a remainder in all of the property into
that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a person convicted of a crime does not suffer . . .
forfeiture of estate or property.”
98. N.D. CENT. CODE 30.1-10-03(1) (2007).
99. The dissent argues that “N.D.C.C. 30.1-10-03(1) is equally specific in prohibiting any
killer from receiving ‘any benefits under the will or under Chapters 30.1-04 through 30.1-11’” and
would have held that the killer should have been treated as predeceased, resulting in the property
passing to the victim’s estate. Id. at 39 (Pederson, J., dissenting). This argument does not
withstand scrutiny. Chapters 30.1-04 through 30.1-11 do not provide any benefits to a joint tenant
killer and joint tenancy property does not pass under a will. The severance of a joint tenancy converts the property to tenancy in common by operation of law, not under any statutory provision.
100. Snortland, 311 N.W.2d at 39.
101. Id.
102. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 8.4 cmt. l; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 188
cmt. b. The Restatement of Restitution further provides that the killer holds the property in a
constructive trust. Presumably this constructive trust would exist to protect the interest of the
estate of the victim in both its one half interest in the income of the property and the remainder
interest in the entire property.
103. The comment does provide that this justification is only necessary when the severance
is not “dictated by statute.” Presumably this means the Restatement supports the notion that
severances can properly be required by statute, as is true under the UPC.
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outright ownership in part of it gives the killer a greater property interest
then he had.104
D. TREATMENT IN THE VARIOUS STATES 105
The various states have produced a variety of results in dealing with
joint tenancy property under their slayer statutes, whether common law or
legislative.
1.

Killer’s Rights in Property Limited

There is considerable support for the idea that a killer’s survivorship
rights in the property of a co-owner/victim should be limited.106 The rationale of the courts is that Principle of Public Policy dictates that no person
should be permitted to profit by his own wrongdoing and that taking full
ownership of the joint tenancy property would result in such a profit.107
The method of actually limiting the right of the killer in the property is
more challenging. By operation of law, property that is held with right of
survivorship passes to the surviving joint owner. Simply taking the property right away is something courts have been reluctant to do.108 One mechanism for overcoming this problem is the use of a constructive trust. The
killer still takes legal title to the entire property as the survivor, but does so
subject to a constructive trust which obligates the killer to hold a portion of
the property for the benefit of others.
Courts that employ constructive trusts generally provide little
discussion beyond the equitable maxims that underlie its use. In Neiman v.

104. While the victim was still alive the killer could have caused a severance and received
outright ownership of a portion of the property, but a court is certainly under no obligation to give
a killer the benefit of what he could have done.
105. Cases dealing with the common law application of the slayer statute must either come
from an era prior to the adoption of the state’s legislature of a slayer statute or in a situation where
the court found the slayer statute inapplicable to the facts before, requiring the application of the
common law.
106. Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Felonious Killing of One Cotenant or Tenant by the
Entireties by the other as Affecting the Latter’s Right in the Property, 42 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1125-29
(1972 & Supp. 2007) (citing cases from seventeen jurisdictions that imposed limitations on
survivorship rights in joint tenant and tenancy by the entirety cases).
107. Id. at 1129 (citing Barnett v. Couey, 27 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930)).
108. Johansen v. Pelton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 625, 632 (1970).
To deprive the heirs of the slayer of all interest in the property is to embrace a policy
which tends to work a forfeiture, attainder, or corruption of the blood, with respect to
the property interest which the surviving malefactor had at the instant before the
slaying, and which, except for intervention on the theory adopted by the trial court,
would have passed to his heirs.
Id.
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Hurff,109 the Supreme Court of New Jersey dealt with the estate of a woman
who had been killed by her husband. The wife had named a charity as her
sole beneficiary and it sought ownership of the couple’s jointly held property. The trial court held that the husband took the property as trustee for
himself and the charity.110 The husband’s interest was limited to an income
interest in one-half the property. While the court felt that it would be
“abhorrent” to allow the husband to retain title to the property, it felt that
divesting him of all legal title “violates or does violence to the doctrine of
vested rights” and would conflict with the state’s statutory prohibitions on
corruption of blood and forfeiture.111 The court then held, however, that
use of the constructive trust allowed the court to avoid conflict with both
vested legal rights and the statutory prohibitions. “The doctrine is so consistent with the equitable principles that have obtained here for centuries
that we have no hesitancy in applying it.”112 The court felt limited, however, in the extent it could use those equitable powers. Granting all
equitable interest in the property to the charity would require depriving the
killer of the right he held as a joint tenant to use of the property for his
lifetime.113 The court felt that since the killer had prevented the determination of the natural order of the deaths of himself and his wife, equity
required a presumption that she would have outlived him.114
The Supreme Court of Illinois solved the problem by finding that the
very act of killing caused a severance of the joint tenancy even in the
absence of a statute mandating that result. In Bradley v. Fox,115 the court
dealt with a husband who killed his wife.116 The husband and the wife’s
daughter from a prior marriage both made claims to the couple’s joint
tenancy property.117 In the prior decision of Welsh v. James 118 the Illinois
Supreme Court had held that a husband who had killed his wife was entitled

109. 93 A.2d 345 (N.J. 1952).
110. Id. at 346.
111. Id. at 347.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. “Equity therefore conclusively presumes for the purpose of working out justice that the
decedent would have survived the wrongdoer.” Id. at 348.
115. 129 N.E.2d 699 (Ill. 1955).
116. Bradley, 129 N.E.2d at 701.
117. Id. The daughter also filed a wrongful death action against her mother’s husband that
had been dismissed by the lower court because the husband, as one of the class of beneficiaries
under the wrongful death act, was prohibited from maintaining an action for damages that he had
caused. Id. at 702. The court overruled the trial court and allowed the daughter’s tort suit to
continue. Id.
118. 95 N.E.2d 872 (Ill. 1950).
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to the entire property which they had held in joint tenancy.119 That
decision, however, was based on the legal fiction that a joint tenant was
“seized of the whole estate” and could not be divested “without violating
the constitutional mandate against corruption of blood or forfeiture of
estate.”120 The court concluded that the authorities relied upon in Welsh did
not, in fact, mandate that conclusion.121 They decided that stare decisis was
not applicable and visited the question anew.
On reexamination, the court held that the prohibition of forfeiture was
simply not applicable. The court began with the acceptance of the broad
policy that a murderer should not enjoy the fruits of his crime.122 The court
then noted that the forfeiture question had been considered in numerous
forums dealing with the question of whether legislative slayer statutes were
enforceable. The court also noted that the slayers statutes “have been
uniformly sustained on the theory that they do not deprive the murderer of
his property, but merely prevent him from acquiring additional property in
an unauthorized and unlawful way.”123
Having determined that forfeiture did not prohibit altering the rights of
the killing joint tenant, the court went on to consider the correct course to
take. The court gave consideration to each of the possibilities and noted
that the use of a constructive trust was urged by “legal scholars” and the
Restatement of Restitution.124 The court found it unnecessary, however, to
use such a trust. Instead, the court gave a closer examination to the nature
of joint tenancy. It found joint tenancy to be in the nature of the contract.
Further, an implied condition of the contract was that neither party would
acquire the interest of the other by murder. When the killer committed the
murder, he violated this implied condition and this destroyed the unities of
joint tenancy.125 The destruction of one of the unities resulted in the
conversion of the property to tenancy in common.126

119. Welsh, 95 N.E.2d at 875. The facts of the Welsh case were not entirely on point because
under Welsh the husband who had murdered his wife was judged to be insane when he committed
the act. Id. at 873.
120. Bradley, 129 N.E.2d at 702.
121. Id. at 703.
122. Bradley, 129 N.E.2d at 704. At the time, Illinois had adopted the slayer statute
suggested by Professor Wade that prohibited a murderer from inheriting. See Wade, supra note
40, at 716. The court correctly noted that the statute was not applicable to joint tenancy property,
but did cite it as support for the broad policy of the state. Bradley, 129 N.E.2d at 704.
123. Bradley, 129 N.E.2d at 114.
124. Id. at 704-05 (citing JAMES BARR AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY &
MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS 310, 321 (1913); GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 478; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 188(b)).
125. The court does not specify which of the unities—interest, title, time or possession—was
destroyed by the killing. It simply jumps to its conclusion that the killer had “by his felonious act,
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Killer’s Rights in Property Unaffected

The courts of four jurisdictions have taken the position that the
survivorship rights of a killer should be unaffected by the murder.127 These
courts felt bound to follow property law and give ownership of the property
to the surviving joint tenant.
In Woodson v. Foster,128 the Supreme Court of Kansas upheld the
vesting of the entire title in joint tenancy property to a husband who had
killed his joint tenant/wife.129 At this time, Kansas had adopted a slayer
statute that prevented any person convicted of feloniously killing another
from inheriting by will or otherwise. The court ruled that joint tenancy
property was not a part of an estate and could not properly be characterized
as inherited.130 Therefore, the slayer statute did not apply. Most importantly, the court ruled that the interests of the joint tenants in the property
vest upon the original conveyance. Because the husband had a vested
interest, it was improper for property law to take the property away.131 The
same court specifically rejected, a decade later, the possibility of using a
constructive trust to achieve the same result in equity that it rejected in
law.132 Courts from Colorado,133 Illinois,134 and Tennessee135 have reached
similar results.
destroyed all rights of survivorship and lawfully retained only the title to his undivided one-half
interest in the property.” Bradley, 129 N.E.2d at 705-06.
126. “It is our conclusion that Fox by his felonious act, destroyed all rights of survivorship
and lawfully retained only the title to his undivided one-half interest in the property in dispute as a
tenant in common. . . .” Bradley, 129 N.E.2d at 706.
127. Purver, supra note 106, § 6 (citing cases from Colorado, Illinois, Kansas and
Tennessee). Pennsylvania courts held that under the common law killers were not prevented from
participating in the estates of theirs victims. The Pennsylvania legislature subsequently adopted a
slayer statute that provided for the severance of joint tenancy property, with both the victim’s
estate and killer taking part of the property. In Re Estate of Larendon, 266 A.2d 763, 767 (Penn.
1970).
128. 320 P.2d 855 (Kan. 1958).
129. Woodson, 320 P.2d at 856.
130. Id. at 860. Under joint tenancy the survivor takes the property under the term of the
original conveyance and not under the laws of intestate succession. Id.
131. Id. The court implied that it might have been acceptable for the legislature to amend the
slayer statute to affect the interests of a killer-joint tenant, but it gives no indication of whether it
meant merely limiting the interests of the killer or denying it entirely. Id. “Although a theory
depriving a murderer of any benefits resulting from his crime appeals to our sense of justice and
equity, we are not permitted to read something into the statute which is not there.” Id.
132. United Trust Co. v. Pyke, 427 P.2d 67, 77 (Kan. 1967).
133. Smith v. Greenburg, 218 P.2d 514, 519 (Colo. 1950) (“[W]e believe it may properly be
said that the creation of joint tenancies and the disposition of property thereunder is dictated as
strictly by pertinent legislation as is the devolution of property under the laws of descent and
distribution.”).
134. Welsh v. James, 95 N.E.2d 872, 875 (Ill. 1950) (“There is no law in this State that
deprives appellee of his vested right in the whole of the estate as the surviving joint tenant.”).
135. Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman, 100 S.W. 108, 111 (Tenn. 1907)
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Killer’s Rights in Property Eliminated

Because the new North Dakota slayer statute has taken the position that
the killer’s interest in joint tenancy property should be voided, a close
examination of the states that have a similar rule is important. Only a few
jurisdictions reportedly take the position that a killer should be denied all
rights in the property held jointly with the victim.136 However, most of the
cited cases show courts avoiding forfeiture issues by reaching the results of
forfeiture through other legal means.137
In Estate of Castiglioni v. Del Pozo,138 the California appellate court
dealt with the disposition of bank accounts and real property held jointly by
a woman and the husband she killed.139 The court held that the wife was
not entitled to receive the joint tenancy property.140 It did not do so, however, through application of a slayer statute. In fact, the court clearly states
that “we have squarely held the joint tenancy property is to be divided
equally between the estates of the victim and the murderer.”141 The court
denied the wife any right in the funds by holding that principles of tracing
and reimbursement were applicable in determining the property interests of
the victim and the killer.142 In essence, the court did not rule that the slayer
statute prevented the killer from taking a continuing interest in the property,
but that the property in question was really not joint tenancy property.143

It was not the intention of the General Assembly that vested rights of this character
should be forfeited by the murderous act of the owner therein stated. It was only
intended that he should not in any way acquire any new rights or property interest
from others as the result of his crime. Any other construction of the statute would
render it void.
Id.
136. The Restatement cites cases from California, Ohio and West Virginia. RESTATEMENT
PROPERTY § 8.4 cmt. 1. American Law Reports cites Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania,
and Montana. Purver, supra note 106, at 1154-57.
137. See, e.g., In re Gatto’s Estate, 74 Pa. D. & C. 529, 538 (Orphans’ Ct. 1950) (ruling that
the victims estate took all of the joint tenancy property when the killer committed suicide and
actually died before the victim).
138. 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
139. Estate of Castiglioni, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289-90.
140. Id. at 290.
141. Id. at 296.
142. Id. The court used provisions of the Probate Code regarding the identification of
separate and community property in holding that placing the funds in a joint tenancy account was
insufficient to convert the funds from the separate property of the decedent to joint tenancy
property. Id. The court similarly used portions of the Family Code allowing tracing in divorce to
identify separate and community property. Id. at 301. While the court acknowledged that the
Family Code was not applicable to the case before it, the court ruled that there were “strong
indicia” of legislative intent to allow rebuttal of joint tenancy presumptions. Id. at 302.
143. For a comparison, see Vesey v. Vesey, 54 N.W.2d 385 (Minn. 1952).
OF
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In In re Estate of Fiore,144 the Ohio Court of Appeals did allow the
joint tenancy property to pass in its entirety to the victim’s estate.145 The
case involved the disposition of funds in a joint tenancy bank account held
by Charles DiPrima and Leonard Fiore.146 Mr. DiPrima pled no contest to
the charge of murdering Mr. Fiore.147 The probate court awarded all property in the joint and survivorship account to the estate of the victim.148 The
appellate court upheld the decision.149 Ohio’s slayer statute did not address
joint tenancy property directly, but did provide that the killer could not “in
any way benefit by the death.”150 Further, the court ruled that the State’s
constitutional prohibition on forfeiture of property by those convicted of a
crime did not apply.151 This result, however, hinged on the fact that the
joint tenancy property in question was a bank account in which both owners
had the right to withdraw all the funds. The killer’s rights to the account
simply were not vested because “either party had full power at any
time . . . , by withdrawals, to extinguish any rights of the other party.”152
The reasoning of the court could not apply to real property, where one joint
tenant is incapable of extinguishing the rights of the other.
In Lakatos v. Billotti,153 the West Virginia Appellate Court dealt with
real property held jointly by married couple.154 The husband killed his wife
and shortly thereafter conveyed the property to his mother.155 The husband
was convicted of the murders and sentenced to life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole.156 The circuit court held that the estate of the victim had no interest in the property.157 The court overturned its prior ruling.
Although the state’s slayer statute had no specific language dealing with
joint tenancy property, the court ruled that it was “unthinkable that our
[L]egislature contemplated giving the fruits of his crime to one who

144. 476 N.E.2d 1093 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
145. In re Estate of Fiore, 476 N.E.2d at 1095.
146. The court was unable to establish how much the killer and victim had individually
deposited into the account. Id. at 1095.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1096 (citing OHIO REV. CODE § 2105.19(A)).
151. Id. at 1097.
152. Id. (citing Bauman v. Hague, 116 N.E.2d 439 (1953)).
153. 509 S.E.2d 594 (W. Va. 1998).
154. Lakotas, 509 S.E.2d at 595.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. (citing State ex rel. Miller v. Sencindiver, 275 S.E.2d 10 (1980)). The circuit court
felt that it was bound by an earlier decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court which held that
the state slayer statute did require divestment of any right in joint tenancy property. Id.
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commits a homicide.”158 The result denying property to the killer was
“inherent in the statute” dealing with joint property.159 The court’s opinion
did not, however, discuss the nature of the killer’s interest in the property or
deal with the impact that forfeiture might have on the decision.
Of particular interest in the Lakatos decision is the fact that it cites the
Montana case of In re Cox Estate160 as supporting its conclusion. Unfortunately, the case provides no such support. In Cox, the Supreme Court of
Montana dealt with property held jointly by a husband and wife. The
husband killed his wife and then committed suicide.161 The district court
held that the husband took all the property because he survived his wife,
albeit by only a short time, and the property was a part of his estate.162 The
district court, however, imposed a constructive trust on the interests of the
wife in the property for the benefit of her heirs. The supreme court upheld
the imposition of this constructive trust.163 The interest held by the husband
was not covered by this constructive trust and its ownership were not the
subject of the appeal to the supreme court. Thus, the Cox case did not
support the ruling of the Lakatos court in denying any interest to the
killer.164
Bierbauer v. Moran 165 represents the clearest application of the denial
of an interest in joint tenancy property to a killer. The case dealt with a
husband who murdered his wife and then committed suicide.166 The court
was dealing with the question of whether the heirs of the wife or the heirs of
the husband should receive the property. The court held that it would be
improper to allow the “willful killing of the wife by the husband” to result
in property going to his estate because “his estate would profit by his

158. Id. at 597.
159. Id.
160. 380 P.2d 584 (Mont. 1963).
161. In re Cox Estate, 380 P.2d at 585.
162. Id. at 585-86.
163. Id. at 591.
164. The Montana Supreme Court revised the issue in Sikora v. Sikora, a case cited by
American Law Reports, as denying a killer joint tenant of the right to share in the estate of joint
tenancy. 499 P.2d 808, 811 (1972). A close reading of the case, however, shows that it simply
upholds the decision in Cox denying the killer an interest in the “share of the joint property owned
by” the victim. Id. at 811.
165. 279 N.Y.S. 176 (App. Div. 1935).
166. Id. at 178-79. The fact of the killing made the then applicable simultaneous death
statute inapplicable because the order of death was clearly ascertainable. If the statute had
applied, the property would have been split between the two estates as if the decedents had been
tenants in common. Id. Under a modern simultaneous death statute, the decedents would be
treated as having died simultaneously despite the fact that the order of death could be determined.
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-702 (2006).
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crime.”167 The property was awarded entirely to the heirs of the wife.168
The court did not discuss what interests the husband might have had in the
property of why those rights could be terminated.
E.

NORTH DAKOTA’S NEW STATUTE

The North Dakota Legislature amended its slayer statute in 2007 to
provide that the interest of the killer in property held with the decedent as
joint tenancy with the right of survivorship is voided.169 The new North
Dakota slayer statute only changes the treatment of joint tenancy.170 So,
while the killer’s heirs will still take under intestacy, application of the antilapse statute, or as takers in default of a power of appointment, they will be
denied the ability to inherit the joint tenancy property.
The legislature retained the subsequent provision in the North Dakota
Century Code that provides protection to third-party purchasers for value of
an interest in the property that had a good-faith reliance on the apparent title
by survivorship in the killer.171 Interestingly, this section does not provide
that the proceeds of such a sale in the hands of the killer will become the
property of the decedent’s estate. Successors to the decedent’s estate would
presumably have to pursue the proceeds of the sale by filing a suit, probably
in wrongful death, against the killer.
The new North Dakota slayer statute does not discuss or justify the
removal of property rights in the joint tenancy property from the killer.
North Dakota now becomes the first state to explicitly attempt to cancel all
interests of a killing joint tenant in the joint tenancy property. Cancelling

167. Bierbauer, 279 N.Y.S. at 179. The court did cite the principle that “no man shall be
permitted to profit by his own wrong” and held that this principle applies to a wrongdoer’s estate
as well as to himself. Id.
168. The decision was followed in In re Estate of Bobula, 25 App. Div. 2d 241 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1966), rev’d on other grounds, 227 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1966). Again, the opinion did not
include any discussion of the killer’s property rights.
169. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03 (2007). “The intentional and felonious killing of the
decedent: . . . (b) voids the interests of the killer in property held with the decedent at the time of
the killing as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.” Id. § 30.1-10-03(3)(b).
170. Other than the changes made to the treatment of joint tenancy property, North Dakota
Century Code Section 30.1-10-03 uses the language contained in UPC Section 2-803.
171. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-04 (2007). The voided interest
under subdivision b of subsection 2 does not affect any third-party interest in property
acquired for value and in good-faith reliance on an apparent title by survivorship . . .
[in the killer] unless a writing declaring the . . . [voided interest] has been noted,
registered, filed, or recorded in records appropriate to the kind and location of the
property which are relied upon, in the ordinary course of transactions involving such
property, as evidence of ownership.
Id. § 30.1-10-04(3).
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property interests by law raises the very real question of whether forfeiture
has taken place, and if so, whether the forfeiture is allowed.
IV. FORFEITURE
Forfeiture occurs when a person is deprived of property because of the
commission of some act.172 Punishing a prisoner through the forfeiture of
property is generally disfavored under the law of the United States.173
North Dakota prohibits the forfeiture of a criminal’s estate upon a conviction.174 While some states contain similar provisions in their state constitutions,175 North Dakota does so by legislative act. This statute is, however,
related to the prohibitions on bills of attainder in the United States and
North Dakota constitutions.176 These provisions all deal with the treatment
of a convicted criminal’s property and are deeply rooted in history.
Attainder applied to a person convicted of a capital felony.177
Attainder could be described as the extinction of person’s “civil rights” at
the same time as he is sentenced to death.178 The attainder resulted in the
criminal forfeiting all land and chattels, corruption of the blood.179 This
attainder comprised an additional component to the criminal’s punishment
for the crime. The criminal’s execution meant that the burden of the forfeiture fell on the criminal’s heirs, who were denied their inheritance of the
criminal’s lands and chattels. Corruption of the blood further prevented the
issue of the criminal from inheriting from the convicted person any property
that was not forfeited.

172. Forfeiture: “2. The loss of a right, privilege, or property because of a crime, breach of
obligation, or neglect of duty.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 677 (8th ed. 2004).
173. The federal judiciary is prohibited from imposing forfeiture or corruption of blood as a
punishment for treason except during the life of the person who committed the treason. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
174. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-33-02 (2007). “Except as otherwise provided by law, a
person convicted of a crime does no suffer civil death or corruption of blood or sustain loss of
civil rights for forfeiture of estate or property, but retains all of his rights, political, personal, civil
and otherwise. . . .” Id.
175. See, e.g., TENN. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“No corruption of blood or forfeiture of estates.”).
The Tennessee Supreme Court has ruled that any statute that would deprive a joint tenant of any
interest in the property as a result of committing murder would be void as forfeiture because of
this provision. Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman, 100 S.W. 108, 111 (Tenn. 1907).
176. U.S. CONST. art. I , §§ 9, 10; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 18.
177. Reppy, supra note 9, at 231.
178. Jacob Reynolds, The Rule of Law and the Origins of the Bill of Attainder Clause, 18 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 177, 182 (2005).
179. Reppy, supra note 9, at 231. Attainder also resulted in “civil death,” essentially the
denial of access to the courts. Id. A similar forfeiting of property under escheat also could apply
to one who was attained. Id. at 233. If the king failed to claim the property forfeited, it could not
descend to the criminal’s heirs because of the corruption of the blood, with the result being that it
would escheat to the criminal’s lord. Id. at 233-34.
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The judicial concept of attainder is distinct, though related, to the
legislative action of a bill of attainder.180 Legislative bodies adopted bills of
attainder to inflict additional penalty on an individual, usually one who had
committed treason or some other serious felony.181 Both the courts and the
Congress maintained the possibility of imposing attainder, so the United
States Constitution outlaws attainder in both Article I and Article III.182
Forfeiture and corruption of the blood existed in feudal England and
were not abolished until late in the nineteenth century. The abolishment
began in 1814 with the provision that corruption of blood should not extend
to new statutory felonies,183 and culminated with the passage of the Statute
of Forfeitures for Treason and Felony passed in 1870.184 As discussed
earlier, the abolition of forfeiture and corruption of the blood gave rise to
the need for slayer statutes.185
The abolition of forfeiture does not mean, however, that a criminal may
not be required to forfeit property as punishment for committing a crime.
Beginning in 1970 with the passages of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act 186 and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act,187 Congress introduced the concept of property forfeiture as a penalty for criminal convictions in some situations.188 Modern
criminal forfeiture differs from attainder in that the property forfeited still
must bear some relationship to the crime committed.189 These criminal
forfeitures do not fall under the constitutional prohibition because they do
not apply to treason,190 and are not bills of attainder.191

180. Reynolds, supra note 177, at 182.
181. Id.
182. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9-10, art. III, § 3.
183. Reppy, supra note 9 at 234-35.
184. Id. at 238.
185. See discussion infra Part II.
186. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1963 (1970).
187. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1970).
188. The use of criminal forfeiture on the federal level has expanded since with the passage
of a general forfeiture statute that has been used to target a variety of different criminal acts. See
Ford, supra note 18, at 1405.
189. Id. at 1406-07.
190. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (applying to the judiciary and only prohibiting corruption of
blood and forfeiture during the life of a person committing treason under a declaration of
Congress).
191. Bills of attainder are acts “of the legislature proposed and passed as any other bill, but
for the specific purpose of attainting individuals. . . .” Reynolds, supra note 177, at 182.
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Criminal forfeitures must be distinguished from civil forfeitures.192 A
criminal forfeiture comes out of a proceeding against a person for a criminal
act. A civil forfeiture is an action in rem against the piece of property that
was used in the commission of a crime or acquired as the result of criminal
activity.193 “It is the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to
a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious
instead of inanimate and insentient.”194 Civil forfeiture is a result of specific authorizing statutes and requires a lower burden of proof than criminal
forfeiture.195 Most importantly, because civil forfeiture is not based on the
criminal culpability of any person, it is not considered punishment on a
person.196
The difference between in rem and criminal forfeiture has procedural
implications as well. Criminal forfeitures require higher levels of due process and can implicate other constitutional rights.197 Civil forfeitures carry
lower due process requirements, but the establishment of the fact that the
property is subject to forfeiture is still required.198
A criminal forfeiture still might not trigger all the safeguards that exist
under the Constitution for criminal trials.199 In Kennedy, the United States
Supreme Court has provided guidelines in determining whether a particular
provision is so punitive that it may only be imposed after a criminal
prosecution.
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether
it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution
and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already
a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally

192. While criminal forfeitures were absent from American law for almost two centuries
after the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, the use of civil forfeiture “developed expansively.”
Ford, supra note 18, at 1403-04.
193. J. Andrew Vines, United States v. Ursery: The Supreme Court Refuses to Extend
Double Jeopardy Protection to Civil in rem Forfeiture, 50 ARK. L. REV . 797, 805 (1998).
194. Waterloo Distilling Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931).
195. See id. (providing a full discussion of civil forfeiture and its case history).
196. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 273 (1996).
197. Among the constitutional rights that can be implicated are: double jeopardy, the right
against self-incrimination, and the right to an attorney. See Douglas Kim, Note and Comment,
Asset Forfeiture: Giving Up Your Constitutional Rights, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 527, 561-78
(1997).
198. Id. at 539.
199. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 184-86 (1963).
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be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive
in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant.200
Applying these standards, the Supreme Court has both struck down and
allowed provisions.201
Cases applying a slayer statute have often dealt with the question of
whether forfeiture has been imposed on the killer. Most of these cases,
however, involve a killer’s attempt to continue to inherit property owned by
the victim. Courts have consistently held that denying a killer the right to
inherit property from a victim does not work forfeiture. Forfeiture can only
occur when property of the killer is taken away. Since killers have at best
an expectancy of receiving property from the victim, it is not forfeiture to
thwart that expectation. The new North Dakota slayer statute requires a
new examination of the concept of forfeiture.
V. ANALYSIS
The threshold question in examining the new North Dakota slayer
statute is whether it results in a forfeiture of the killer’s property at all. The
courts that have examined slayer statutes in multiple jurisdictions have
determined that they did not result in forfeiture.202 These cases, however,
usually dealt with the general application of the slayer statute to prevent
killers from inheriting any portion of the victim’s estate, rather then with
denying them something that the killer already owned.
The new North Dakota slayer statute not only prevents a killer from
taking over the victim’s interest in property held in joint tenancy, but also
deprives the killer from any interest in the property. The revision is unique
as it represents the first legislative attempt to use a slayer statute to completely deprive a killing joint tenant of any right in the property.203 Both the
200. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
201. Id. at 148-86 (invalidating a statute that stripped the citizenship from any person
remained outside of the United States to avoid military service during time of war); Wong Wing v.
United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235-38 (1896) (invalidating a statute that required aliens to be held
for one year at hard labor before being deported); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1986)
(upholding statute that provided for civil commitment of “sexually dangerous persons”); United
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-51 (1980) (upholding statute that imposed civil penalties on
parties discharging hazardous substances).
202. Bradley v. Fox, 129 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ill. 1955) (upholding the slayer statute on the
ground that it does “not deprive the murderer of property, but merely prevent[s] him from
acquiring additional property in an unauthorized and unlawful way”); Neiman v. Hurff, 93 A.2d
345, 347 (N.J. 1952) (applying the slayer statute “does not interfere with vested legal rights”); see
also Purver, supra note 106, § 8.
203. Two courts have ruled that legislatures have done so indirectly by providing that a killer
should be treated as having predeceased the victim. See cases cited supra note 152 and 164. They
ruled that using that fiction, the victim survived the killer and took full ownership of the property
as the surviving joint tenant. Id.
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Restatement and the UPC, by providing a life estate in the property to the
killer or by severing the joint tenancy, have taken the position that depriving the killer of all interest in the property is improper.
The fact that no other jurisdiction or authority has gone as far as North
Dakota in applying the Principle of Public Policy does not, by itself, mean
that the new North Dakota slayer statute should not be adopted. What is
vital, however, is that the new position be carefully assessed to ensure that
other important legal principles will not be sacrificed. The new North
Dakota slayer statute deprives a person of property and therefore must be
consistent with the general principle disfavoring the taking of property.
But, how does the statute take property and what is the significance of that
method?
The new North Dakota slayer statute clearly causes the killer to lose
property. The killer owns a property interest. This interest became fully
vested at the time of the original conveyance of the property into joint tenancy. The new North Dakota slayer statute deprives the killer of the continued ownership and enjoyment of the property despite the fact that the
killer satisfies the only pre-condition under property law, being alive. This
is forfeiture.
While forfeitures can be either criminal or civil, the new North Dakota
statute does not fit within the definition of a civil forfeiture. The property
being forfeited, the killer’s previously held interest in the joint tenancy
property, is not the fruits of criminal activity and was not a part of the
criminal activity.204 Further, taking results because of a determination by a
court that the killer had “feloniously and intentionally” killed another.
Given the fact that the property taken from the killer does not have to be
involved in the killing, it appears that the forfeiture cannot be deemed in
rem. This leaves the only conclusion that the forfeiture is criminal in
nature, i.e., a punishment for the commission of a crime. If the property is
not “guilty” of a crime, then taking it from the owner must be because of
the in personam actions of the person owning the property. “A civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather
can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes
is punishment, as we have come to understand that term.”205 This makes
the forfeiture under the new North Dakota slayer statute criminal in nature.

204. United States v. Usery, 282 U.S. 267, 294 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The
theory is that the property, whether or not illegal or dangerous in nature, is hazardous in the hands
of this owner because either he uses it to commit crimes, or allows others to do so.”).
205. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989).
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Even as a criminal forfeiture, the new North Dakota slayer statute must
be assessed to determine if it triggers full constitutional protections. Several of these Kennedy factors triggering full constitutional protection clearly
exist in the case of the new North Dakota slayer statute.206 Others are
difficult to assess without knowing exactly what the legislature intended in
adopting the new rule.207
The North Dakota Legislature may have had many motives in passing
the new North Dakota slayer statute: As a preventative measure to discourage killing; as a punishment for killers; to provide for compensation for the
heirs and devisees of the victim other than the killers. The North Dakota
Legislature did not label its new slayer statute as a forfeiture, either civil or
criminal. This perhaps is owing to the belief that it was merely amending a
property law.
Whatever the intent of the North Dakota Legislature, it seems clear that
the new North Dakota slayer statute is a forfeiture of property held by the
killer. While criminal forfeitures are perfectly allowed, they must be accompanied by the procedural protections governing any criminal punishment. Even if application of the Kennedy factors would not trigger full due
process, at least some protections would have to be provided. The new
North Dakota slayer statute clearly lacks these protections.
Criminal forfeitures, like all criminal sanctions, can only be implemented with all of the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments.208 These safeguards are clearly denied in the
206. The new North Dakota slayer statute clearly requires a finding of scienter, the behavior
penalized is already a crime. The discussion of forfeiture supra at Section IV shows that denying
a convicted individual of his property has also historically been considered punishment for a
crime, though the rise of civil forfeiture may mean that this is no longer the case.
207. Any forfeiture or penalty could promote the traditional aims of retribution and
deterrence. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (citing United States v.
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1963) and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 98, 111-12 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). The legislature did not attempt to connect any purpose to the rule, so it is difficult to
determine whether such purpose is rational. Whether the penalty might be excessive will vary
greatly on a case by case basis.
208. The Fifth Amendment reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger,
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
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implementation of the new North Dakota slayer statute. The killer’s “guilt”
is determined by a court, not by a jury. The standard for the finding is a
preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt. The sanction can be implemented even if the killer died before the proceeding
begins, so the killer would be denied any opportunity to present a defense.
While it is unlikely that the new North Dakota slayer statute can pass
constitutional muster, that does not mean that heirs of victims are without
recourse. They have the same rights to prevent unjust enrichment by killers
that existed prior to the recent amendment. A wrongful death suit can be
filed against the killer or killer’s estate and assuming the facts are proven, a
judgment will issue. The victim’s heirs can then assert this claim against
the killer or killer’s estate in the same manner as any other creditor.
The new North Dakota slayer statute fails equitable standards in other
ways as well. While the assumption has been that only the killer, the victim, and their heirs are involved, this will not always be the case. Property
held by any person or estate can be pursued by creditors. The new North
Dakota slayer statute deprives the creditors of the killer from a source from
which they could seek compensation for their claims.
The UPC and the Restatement have both provided systems for dealing
with joint tenancy property held by killers and their victims. In both cases
the rights of the killer have been protected by ensuring that only killers’
chances to obtain more property than that which they already own will be
affected by the killing. The Principle of Public Policy really asks for
nothing more. The new North Dakota slayer statute, by crossing the line
between denying a killer the chance to receive new property and taking the
killer’s existing property has turned the slayer statute into an instrumentality of criminal punishment.
While the North Dakota Legislature may have been trying to prevent
situations that could be deemed “absurd,” it did so by trampling the rights
of the killer in a way that is not justified under the U.S. Constitution. The
new North Dakota slayer statute should be repealed and either UPC or
Restatement versions of the slayer statute adopted.

witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

